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Abstract—In this paper a method for assessing the struc-
tural vulnerability of two coupled energy distribution systems
is proposed. The co-existing of an electric power distribution
system and a district heating system is described and modelled,
under the assumption that the operation of the district heating
system is directly dependent on electric power. The structural
vulnerability of the two systems subject to single failures or a
set of simultaneous failures in the power system is found. Thus,
the consequences of power system failures for the energy supply
as a whole are quantified.
Index Terms—Power distribution, district heating, vulnera-
bility, reconfiguration, network constraints, genetic algorithms
(GAs), linear programming
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliability analysis of electric power systems is a rather
mature field of study, covering all essential parts of the system
[1], [2]. Analysing simultaneous failures in addition to single
failures at distribution level will normally not significantly
influence the reliability indices, due to low probability of
occurrence and modest increase in consequences. Thus, most
methods for reliability analysis of distribution systems focus
on single failures.
On the other hand, simultaneous failures may be a result of
extraordinary circumstances – such as adverse weather, mali-
cious attacks and loss of supporting infrastructures – and will
challenge the use of both human and equipment resources. The
occurrence of simultaneous failures are not easily predicted
and the use of generic failure rates and repair times may not
be appropriate for analysing the system impact of these. In this
work we emphasise on finding the consequences of multiple
simultaneous failures, leaving considerations on probability of
occurrence and duration of such failure sets to the judgement
of the analyst.
Interruptions of electricity supply may also degrade the
performance of parallel energy infrastructures, e.g. district
heating and natural gas systems, which are more or less
dependent on electricity for proper operation. Consequently,
in order to capture the consequences of power system failures
for the energy supply as a whole, these parallel infrastructures
and their links to the power system should be modelled.
In this paper a method for assessing the structural vulnera-
bility of two coupled energy distribution systems is proposed.
The overall aim is to find the vulnerability of the energy
system as a whole to single or simultaneous failures in the
power system. The structural vulnerability of the systems with
respect to failures in the power system is defined as the
consequences caused in both systems. Thus, the concept of
vulnerability, as defined here, is not related to the probability
of such failure sets to occur.
Several recent studies have addressed the concept of vul-
nerability in electric power systems, ranging from graph
theoretical investigations in [3]–[5] to investigations based on
more physical models in [6], [7]. These studies all refer to
the transmission system, and there is a large gap between the
applied definitions of vulnerability. In [8], the vulnerability to
failures at distribution level is analysed using a network ana-
lytic approach. Here, the electrical properties of the network
are neglected and vulnerability is defined as the degree of loss
or damage to the system when exposed to a perturbation of a
given type and magnitude.
Some studies have been conducted regarding infrastructural
dependency modelling. In [9] a general overview of different
kinds of interdependencies in critical infrastructures is given.
A network analytic approach is presented in [10], identifying
vulnerabilities in local distribution systems of electricity, nat-
ural gas and water. Furthermore, [11] and [12] describe and
analyse the impact of natural-gas system reliability on electric
power transmission systems.
The proposed method is described and illustrated for an
electric power distribution system (EPDS) co-existing with
a district heating system (DHS). The operation of the DHS
is directly dependent on electricity. The following section
describes the system modelling approach and the correspond-
ing underlying assumptions for both the EPDS and DHS.
Section III presents a screening strategy used for finding the
most critical failure sets in the EPDS. A limited number of
failure sets are fully analysed for both systems. In section IV,
a simple example is elaborated, before the method is applied
in a case study in section V.
II. SYSTEM MODELLING
Two simple systems, an EPDS and a DHS, are presented
below, and a method suitable for finding the systems’ vulner-
abilities to failures in the EPDS is elaborated. Both the EPDS
and the DHS are modelled as networks, comprising a set of
nodes N and a set of branches B, following an object-oriented
modelling approach.
A. Vulnerability Measure
Various indices may be applied for quantification of con-
sequences associated with interruption of energy supply in
the two systems. In this study, the frequency and duration
of interruptions are not calculated, and the consequences are
simply described in terms of interrupted electric and thermal
power for the EPDS and the DHS, denoted CEPDS and
CDHS , respectively. It should be noted that other relevant
system indices, e.g. indices related to the number and type
of consumers having their supply interrupted could easily be
incorporated in the presented method.
B. Electric Power Distribution System
Fig. 1 resembles a simple EPDS, comprising nodes 1-8 and
branches b1-b9. The system serves seven load points (nodes 2-
8). All branches have switches at their sending and receiving
ends, see illustration in the top-right corner of Fig. 1. Branches
b3 and b9 are load-transfer branches, having normally open
switches at both ends. Node 1 represents the energy in-feed
point, typically being a HV/MV substation.
Permanent branch and node failures in the EPDS have
the potential to interrupt the service to load points. Gener-
ally, two distinctive types of interruptions may be classified,
depending on interruption duration. Some load points will
have their supply restored after a network reconfiguration,
while others will have to wait for the repair of one or more
of the faulted components. This study only considers the
consequences caused by the latter type of interruption. Thus,
an idealised system representation with instantaneous network
reconfiguration is assumed.
The following assumptions were made when analysing the
EPDS:
• temporary failures are not considered;
• all switchgear is fully reliable;
• upstream supply from HV/MV substations is fully reli-
able;
• load points are either fully supplied or not supplied at all.
Moreover, it was assumed that faulted load-point nodes
will be isolated by the operation of a fuse, see illustration in
Fig. 1. Thus, only power supply to that particular node will be
interrupted. The further studies only consider branch failures
in the EPDS.
For each failure set in the EPDS, the following steps are
taken to find the system consequences CEPDS :
1) Isolate the faulted branches by using the available
switches
2) Run a Genetic Algorithm (GA) to find the optimal use
of switches to minimise CEPDS subject to the following
constraints:
a) nodal voltages are not lower than a predefined min-
imum value at load nodes i; ∀i ∈ N : Vi ≥ Vmin
b) branch thermal limits are not exceeded for any
branch b; ∀b ∈ B : Ib ≤ Ib,max
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Fig. 2. A simple district heating system.
c) the system is radially operated
The GA was modelled using the simple genetic algorithm,
thoroughly described in [13], from the library GAlib [14].
C. District Heating System
A simple DHS is presented in Fig. 2, comprising the
following nodes; two thermal power production units (nodes
1 and 8), two pumps (nodes 4 and 6) and four load points
(nodes 2, 3, 5 and 7). The system is operated as a meshed
system, i.e. water may flow in all pipelines in Fig. 2.
It is possible to formulate the thermal power flow in a
DHS as a function of network temperatures and pressures. In
order for the system to satisfy consumers’ needs, water with
adequate temperature and pressure must be circulated to the
load points.
In this study, only DHS node failures caused by loss of
supply from the EPDS are analysed. DHS pipelines and valves
are assumed fully reliable whenever the EPDS has faulted
components. Loosing electric power supply to nodes in the
DHS may result in insufficient circulating pressure and/or
insufficient thermal power production, which in turn may
cause interruption of supply to DHS load points. Note that
short interruptions of electric power supply to DHS nodes are
not treated here, as EPDS reconfiguration is assumed to take
place instantaneously. Short electric power interruptions have
the potential to trip DHS pumps leading to thermal power
interruptions. However, this kind of analysis calls for dynamic
system studies and is outside the scope of this paper.
Pressure and temperature distribution studies may be decou-
pled and performed separately. Changes in pressure are quickly
transferred throughout the whole system, typically taking only
a few seconds. Temperature changes are slower and closely
related to the speed of the circulating water. However, as this
study is not concerned with the duration of interruptions, we
do not differentiate between the interruptions caused by lack
of pumping capacity and those caused by lack of thermal
power production capacity. It is generally assumed that repair
of faulted components in the EPDS is slower than the dynamic
response of the DHS. Thus, only steady-state considerations
of thermal power flow are dealt with in this work.
It is assumed that all DHS nodes can be isolated and
bypassed. Consequently, in case a thermal power production
unit or pump lacks supply from the EPDS, the hot water is
simply bypassed this unit without any increase in temperature
or pressure. Furthermore, in case load has to be curtailed in the
DHS due to a deficit in thermal power production or pumping
capacity, it is assumed possible to bypass any load point in
the system. Depending on which node types that are without
electric power, different types of analysis are performed, as
described below:
1) DHS pump: If supply from the EPDS to a DHS pump
is lost, the pump is bypassed and load points in the DHS will
experience a drop in pressure. An initial study of pressure
distributions reveals whether load point pressures are suffi-
cient, i.e. higher than a predefined minimum value pmin. If
this constraint is not met, load has to be disconnected. A GA
is initiated for the purpose of minimising the consequences
(CDHS) of load curtailment in the DHS while meeting the
pressure requirement.
2) DHS production unit: If supply from the EPDS to a
DHS thermal power production unit is lost, a capacity deficit
may occur in the DHS. Rerouting of thermal power flow may
also enforce bottlenecks in the DHS. The thermal power flow
problem is formulated as a mixed integer programming (MIP)
problem using the linear programming library GLPK [15].
The formulation relies on a lossless, steady-state network flow
model. The problem formulation is stated as:
MIN.:
CDHS =
∑
i∈N
(1− xi)Di (1a)
S.T.:
∑
j:(ji)∈B
P tb(j,i) −
∑
j:(ij)∈B
P tb(i,j) + Gi − xiDi = 0
(1b)
|P tb | ≤ P
t
b,max (1c)
Gi ≤ Gi,max (1d)
Where xi is a boolean variable indicating whether load
point i is served or not, and CDHS denotes the total amount
of interrupted thermal power. Restriction (1b) describes the
nodal thermal-power balance for each node i, where B is the
collection of all branches in the DHS, P t
b(i,j) denotes thermal
power flow in branch b connecting nodes i and j, and Gi and
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Fig. 3. Class diagram illustrating the node hierarchy.
Di are the thermal power production and demand at node i,
respectively. Restriction (1c) forces the thermal power flow in
each branch not to exceed the capacity constraint P tb,max for
that branch. Gi is constrained by its maximum power Gi,max
in (1d).
3) DHS load point: Normally the DHS will interface with
aggregated load points trough a heat exchanger, and water is
circulated in an underlying secondary circuit supplying smaller
loads. Loosing electric power at this location will disable the
circulating pumps in the secondary circuit, and consequently
the entire aggregated load point will be interrupted. However,
the surrounding system is not directly affected by such local
effects.
D. Modelling Dependencies
Fig. 3 shows an excerpt of the Unified Modelling Language
(UML) class diagram for the node hierarchy applied in the
joint modelling of the two systems. Instance variables and
functions are omitted for brevity.
Each node in the DHS (DHS Node) has a link to one load
point in the EPDS (EPDS LoadPoint) in Fig. 3. Each EPDS
load point has an association to zero, one or several DHS
nodes. DHS nodes comprise load (DHS LoadPoint), pump
(DHS Pump) and production unit (DHS Production) nodes.
In case an EPDS load point experiences an interruption, the
model checks for associated DHS nodes. If associated DHS
nodes are found, the consequences are analysed depending on
the type of faulted DHS node(s), as previously described.
III. FAILURE SET SYNERGY
Applying the presented method to large scale infrastruc-
tures analysing higher-order failure sets is computationally
intensive. A screening strategy inspired by [16] was applied
in order to fully analyse only the most critical failure sets.
Thus, computation time is reduced as well as the number of
failure sets to evaluate after the simulation has been performed.
The strategy is based on the concept of synergy, as explained
below.
Consider the EPDS under study consisting of n components
being subject to a failure set Fki . The failure set is set number
i of order k. The maximum number of failure sets of order k
is found by (2).
ikmax =
n!
(n− k)!k!
(2)
In case k is larger than 1, it will be possible divide Fki into
a certain number of divisions, where each division comprises
the same components as in Fki . Consider a set of order
3, comprising components a, b and c. There are 4 possible
divisions (d1 − d4) of F3(abc) , as shown below.
F3(abc)


d1 : F2(ab) +F1(c),
d2 : F2(ac) +F1(b),
d3 : F2(bc) +F1(a),
d4 : F1(a) +F1(b) + F1(c)
If Fki gives rise to larger consequences (CEPDS) than the
sum of consequences in any of its divisions, Fki is said to
be synergistic. In other words; if Fki is the minimum cut
set for at least one EPDS load point, it will be synergistic.
Thus, the synergy concept relates to network connectivity and
reconfiguration capability of the EPDS.
It is possible to screen higher-order failure sets according
to their synergy. A failure set of order k may cause large
consequences, but if the failure set has no synergy, it indicates
that these consequences were counted for when analysing sets
of lower order. Thus, running the simulation with an increasing
value of k, allows us to emphasise on the synergistic failures
sets.
The screening procedure was implemented in the structural
vulnerability assessment method as illustrated in Fig. 4. First,
the depth of the analysis is set by choosing the highest failure-
set order to be considered (kmax). Determining kmax is the
choice of the analyst, depending on how many simultaneous
failures that are considered feasible. For each k, ikmax is found
from (2). In case the failure set is synergistic and DHS nodes
loose supply from the EPDS, one of the steps described in
Subsections II-C1 - II-C3 is performed, depending on which
DHS node types that are without electricity.
IV. EXAMPLE
In order to illustrate the proposed method, an example is
presented based on the two systems shown in Figs. 1 and 2.
The example is limited to EPDS branch failures only, and
failure sets comprising three or less branches. As the EPDS
has 9 branches, there are 129 failure sets in total. For clarity
and simplicity, we assume that the EPDS is unconstrained.
The DHS has no pipeline capacity constraints of type (1c),
but will have to meet a pressure requirement pmin = 0.9 p.u.
at all load points. All load points in both systems serve a load
of 1 MW.
Fig. 5 shows the couplings between EPDS load points and
DHS nodes in this example. The thermal power production
units do not depend on electric power from the EPDS.
A total of 36 failure sets are synergistic; 27 third and 9
second-order sets. These synergistic sets are treated further in
the DHS analysis. A plot of the resulting consequences for the
EPDS (CEPDS) and DHS (CDHS) for the synergistic failure
sets is presented in Fig. 6. Open circles indicate failure sets
of second order and filled circles indicate third-order failure
sets. For each circle in Fig. 6, there is a set of failure sets
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Fig. 4. Flowchart of the structural vulnerability assessment method.
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Fig. 5. Dependency of a DHS on electric power. Couplings between EPDS
load points and DHS nodes are indicated by arrows.
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Fig. 6. Interrupted power for both the EPDS (CEPDS) and the DHS
(CDHS). Failure sets of second order are marked with ◦ and third order
with •.
causing this tuple of consequences. For three of these tuples,
the corresponding failure sets are listed in the figure.
As an example, 3 synergistic failure sets will cause the
consequence tuple of CEPDS = 1 MW and CDHS = 1 MW,
as indicated in Fig. 6. If b1 and b2 fail simultaneously, EPDS
node 2 will experience an interruption. According to Fig. 5,
the load point at node 2 in the DHS looses supply from the
EPDS and is interrupted. If b2 and b3 fail, EPDS node 3 will
experience an interruption. This time, the DHS pump at node
4 in Fig. 2 will loose electric power supply. The GA reveals
that the DHS system is only capable of serving 3 out of 4
load points in this state, thus CDHS = 1 MW. Finally, in case
b7 and b8 fail, both the load at node 3 and the pump at node
6 will loose power. As it is assumed that node 3 in the DHS
is bypassed in this situation, the pressure constraints are not
violated and no additional load points in the DHS has to be
curtailed.
Simultaneous failure of b4 and b6 is the most criti-
cal second-order failure set in terms of total consequences
(CEPDS+CDHS). Furthermore, not surprisingly, the third-
order failure set comprising b1, b4 and b7 causes maximum
consequences for both systems.
V. CASE STUDY
The presented method was tested on the coupled EPDS
and DHS located in the city centre of Trondheim, Norway. A
system boundary was defined, including only the central parts
of the two systems. Figs. 7 and 8 present the structure of the
two systems. It should be noted that both system models are
simplified, but still reflect the basic design of the real networks.
The central part of the DHS is shown in Fig. 7. This system
comprises 3 pumps, 8 thermal power production units and 11
load points, and the total installed capacity and maximum load
is 149 MW and 106 MW, respectively. The surrounding EPDS
is a medium-voltage cable network fed by 3 HV/MV substa-
tions and serving 34 load points. The voltage and pressure
constraints were set to Vmin = 0.95 p.u. and pmin = 0.90 p.u.
Couplings between the two systems are mapped as in Fig. 5,
but is not presented here for practical reasons.
Fig. 7. Overview of the central district heating system.
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A simulation was performed for failure sets comprising
three or less components, considering only EPDS branch
failures. In total there are 40 first, 780 second and 9880
third-order failure sets. From the simulation it was found
that 12 first, 64 second and 176 third-order failure sets have
synergistic consequences. A scatter plot of the consequence
tuples caused by these synergistic failure sets is presented in
Fig. 9. Consequences are measured in interrupted electric and
thermal power, in percentage of the total load served in each
of the two systems.
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Fig. 9. Interrupted power in percentage of total load for both the EPDS
(CEPDS) and DHS (CDHS). Failure sets of first order are marked with ,
second order with ∗ and third order with ◦.
In Table I the synergistic failure sets causing maximum
consequences, both in terms of CEPDS and CDHS , are listed.
The maximum CEPDS in second and third-order synergistic
failure sets was found to be 27.6 and 36.3 % of the total
load in the EPDS, respectively. For comparison, the maximum
CEPDS in second and third-order non-synergistic failure sets
was found to be 20.0 and 34.0 %.
At most 1.9 % of the DHS load is interrupted due to single
branch failures in the EPDS. This result indicates that the DHS
is not particularly vulnerable to single failures in the EPDS. In
fact, all the major DHS load points, pumps and thermal power
production units can receive power from more than one EPDS
feeder.
Studying the two second-order failure sets listed in Table I,
it is evident that the set causing the highest value of CEPDS
causes only minor consequences in the DHS. On the contrary,
if branches b5 and b16 fail simultaneously, violation of EPDS
network constraints limits the reconfiguration capability, re-
sulting in EPDS load point interruptions. The system is recon-
figured to minimise the interrupted electric power. Cascading
consequences in the DHS are not considered when finding the
optimal use of switches in the EPDS. For this particular failure
set a vulnerable DHS node looses electric power supply, giving
a high value of CDHS .
The third-order failure set comprising branches b1, b12 and
b35 isolates a part of the EPDS which is crucial for proper
DHS operation; thus, more than 50 % of the total DHS load
is interrupted.
TABLE I
MAXIMUM CONSEQUENCES FOR FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD-ORDER
SYNERGISTIC FAILURE SETS.
Order Maximum Set CEPDS (%) CDHS (%)
1st CEPDS b26 13.7 0.0
CDHS b18 0.0 1.9
2nd CEPDS b11, b26 27.6 6.6
CDHS b5, b16 8.8 18.9
3rd CEPDS b8, b26, b37 36.3 21.7
CDHS b1, b12, b35 23.6 52.8
Although the non-synergistic failure sets are screened out, a
thorough interpretation of the remaining synergistic failure sets
Fsyn can be tedious. Finding the EPDS branches contributing
the most to consequences in Fksyn of a given order k, will
provide a measure of component criticality. The contribution R
to consequences C (CEPDS or CDHS) of branch b is defined
as the ratio between the sum of the consequences caused by
synergistic failure sets including branch b and the sum of
consequences for all synergistic failure sets:
R(b, k) =
∑
F∈Fksyn,b∈F
[C(F)]
∑
F∈Fksyn
[C(F)]
Table II shows the three components that contributed the
most to consequences (in terms of CEPDS and CDHS) caused
by second-order synergistic failure sets.
TABLE II
BRANCH CONTRIBUTION TO CONSEQUENCES IN SECOND-ORDER
SYNERGISTIC FAILURE SETS.
C = CEPDS C = CDHS
Rank Branch (b) Contr. (R) Branch (b) Contr. (R)
1 b26 0.090 b16 0.115
2 b24 0.075 b20 0.113
3 b20 0.069 b21 0.076
VI. DISCUSSION
In this study, the frequencies and durations of interruptions
were not considered, only the system consequences in terms
of interrupted electric and thermal power. Obviously, before
drawing final conclusions regarding critical components and
possible system reinforcements, one have to somehow evaluate
how often interruptions are expected to occur and for how long
they are expected to last.
Furthermore, the assumptions regarding the two systems’
responses and operations due to failures can be questioned.
It is difficult to generalise such behaviour when the failure
repair time is unknown. For example, loosing power to a
DHS thermal power production unit for a short time, leading
to a short-time capacity deficit in the DHS, will rarely be
noticed by the average consumer. This work relies on the
assumption that electric power interruptions affecting supply
to DHS nodes last longer than the time it takes for the thermal
power flow to reach steady-state. More detailed system studies
could address the dynamic response of the DHS subject to
short electric power interruptions, and the sequence of backing
up or restarting faulted pumps and production units.
In the presented method, the post-failure system configu-
rations are found in two separate steps. First, the EPDS is
reconfigured to minimise interrupted electric power by using
the available switches. Subsequently, in case any DHS nodes
are without power, curtailed thermal power is minimised while
meeting the DHS network constraints. A perhaps more realistic
reconfiguration algorithm would integrate the two reconfig-
uration steps in one procedure. In this way, the cascading
consequences in the DHS are considered when finding the
optimal use of switches in the EPDS. By integrating the
system reconfigurations in this manner, it is likely to expect a
reduction in CDHS and a slight increase in CEPDS for some
failure sets. In the end, the most representative algorithm will
always be the one reflecting the actual communication and
cooperation between the distribution system operators.
Finally, it should be noted that simulating the EPDS as a
partial system may result in a higher measure of structural
vulnerability than in reality, since boundary nodes may be
fed by surrounding system parts. These parts are outside the
system boundary and are therefore not included in the system
model.
VII. CONCLUSION
A method was proposed, suitable for analysing the structural
vulnerability of an electric power distribution system co-
existing with a district heating system. The structural vul-
nerability of these systems with respect to failures in the
power system was defined as the consequences caused in both
systems. The cascading consequences due to loss of electric
power to essential components in the district heating system
was discussed and modelled. The method enables the analyst
to consider higher-order failure sets in the electric power
system and find the consequences caused in both systems.
Furthermore, a screening procedure was applied to identify
and fully analyse only the most critical failure sets.
The method was applied to a case study, where the failure
sets causing the highest consequences were identified. It
was briefly discussed and shown how to rank power system
components in terms of criticality.
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